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MAIN STREET MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE FIRMS:
LABORATORIES FOR THE FUTURE
Susan Poser*
This Article examines the debate over multidisciplinary practice in the wake of the
collapse of Enron and Arthur Andersen. Part I addresses the history of the schol-
arly debate about multidisciplinary practice in the United States. It discusses the
focus on large multidisciplinary firms, feared threats to independent professional
judgment, and the current rule concerning lawyers and multidisciplinary practice.
Part II examines the reasons for allowing multidisciplinary practice. The author
argues that client demand, lawyer demand, and policy reasons all provide valid
reasons for permitting "one-stop" shopping. Part I also discusses existing forms of
multidisciplinary practice. The author argues that the methods used by those
groups in dealing with ethical and professional considerations indicate that small-
scale, or "Main Street" multidisciplinary firms can provide improved service to cli-
ents without endangering the legal profession.
In Part III, Professor Poser proposes a solution: permitting small-scale multidisci-
plinary practice, on a state-by-state basis. The author argues that permitting such
firms would meet client demand for improved, integrated service, while also allow-
ing state bar associations to determine if larger-scale multidisciplinary practice is
feasible, based on the experience of smaller firms.
INTRODUCTION
Fully integrated, multidisciplinary practice (MDP) has been de-
fined as a partnership, professional corporation, or other
association or entity that includes lawyers and non-lawyers and has
as one, but not all, of its purposes the delivery of legal services to
clients other than the MDP itself or that holds itself out to the pub-
lic as providing non-legal, as well as legal, services.'
* Assistant Professor, University of Nebraska College of Law; B.A. 1985, Swarthmore
College;J.D. 1991, Ph.D. 2000, University of California, Berkeley. The author would like to
thank Norman Poser and Stephen Kalish for their helpful comments and suggestions, and
Andrea Schaneman and Michael Rogers who provided excellent research assistance. The
author is also grateful for the University of Nebraska College of Law McCollum Summer
Research Grant which helped support the research and writing of this Article.
1. AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION (ABA) COMM'N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE,
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 1 (1999), availabe at http://www,.abanet.org/
cpr/mdpreport.html (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform) [here-
inafter 1999 Report].
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Under current ethics rules in every state, it would be a violation
of professional ethics to participate in any type of MDP. The rules
prohibit law firms from partnering with accountants in order to
expand the services they provide to their corporate clients, and
they prohibit solo practitioners from partnering with financial
planners and social workers to advise divorce and estate-planning
clients. In the District of Columbia, some types of MDPs are al-
lowed provided that the non-lawyers are only facilitating the legal
advice and not advising clients on non-legal matters. In 1999 and
2000, the Multidisciplinary Practice Commission of the American
Bar Association (MDP Commission) recommended that the
American Bar Association (ABA) amend its Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct to permit fully integrated MDPs. The House of
Delegates of the ABA rejected the recommendation and retained
the current prohibition.
This Article argues that the focus of the MDP debate has been
both too narrow and too broad. It has been too narrow because the
debate has centered almost exclusively on "Wall Street MDPs," that
is, the prospect of large business organizations such as accounting
firms or banks hiring lawyers to give legal advice to their large cor-
porate and business clients. 3 But as one person who testified before
the MDP Commission put it: "The question of whether a Fortune
500 company could save money if one of the giant accounting
firms could offer legal services, tax advice and other types of busi-
ness services under one roof just doesn't necessarily resonate with
ordinary people., 4 The debate has been too broad because it has
2. In 1991, the District of Columbia adopted a more flexible version of Model Rule
5.4 which allows lawyers and non-lawyers to share fees so long as the organization's sole
purpose is the provision of legal services, and the members of the firm abide by the legal
ethics rules. See, D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1991); Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise
Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of Purchasing Legal Services from Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary
Partnership, 13 CEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 217, 243-44 (2000). In February 2002, the American
Bar Association adopted a further exception that allows a non-profit organization to share
court-awarded fees with a lawyer who is retained, recommended, or employed by the non-
profit. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a)(4) (2002).
3. Phoebe A. Haddon, The MDP Controversy: What Legal Educators Should Know, 50J.
LEGAL EDUC. 504, 517 (2000) (noting that the issue of Main Street MDPs was overshadowed
by the large, professional service firm issue). See also Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Ser-
vices to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 531, 539 (1994) (describing the legal
profession as divided into "two hemispheres: lawyers who serve individuals and those who
serve corporate clients."); Sydney M. Cone, lII, Views on Multidisciplinary Practice with Particu-
lar Reference to Law and Economics, New York, and North Carolina, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1
(2001).
4. Written Remarks of Lora H. Weber, President and Executive Director, Consumers
Alliance of the Southeast, to ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice (Mar. 11, 1999),
available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/weberl.html (on file with the University of Michi-
gan Journal of Law Reform).
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been assumed that if fully integrated MDPs were permitted, it
would have to be under a one-size-fits-all rule that covered global
corporations, small-firm practices, and everything in between.
Those who object to permitting the large accounting firms to prac-
tice law, whether for ethical or economic reasons, do not seem to
have considered the possibility of fully integrated MDPs for a lim-
ited type of private firm.
This Article focuses on the "Main Street MDP"6 and proposes a
rule that would allow for that form of practice only. The Main
Street MDP is exemplified by the small firm or solo practitioner
that forms a partnership with other professionals in order to
provide more comprehensive and efficient service to clients.
Family law and estate planning are often mentioned as practices
that a Main Street MDP would deliver more efficiently.7 A narrower,
more focused MDP rule would provide an opportunity to promote
the States as laboratories and take an incremental approach to
introducing and testing the MDP concept." It makes sense to begin
with the small firm, which is the most common way in which law is
practiced,9 because it poses fewer ethical risks.
Recent events do not inspire confidence that the organized Bar
will soon embrace multidisciplinary practice as a legitimate and
ethical way to serve clients. The ABA, at every opportunity, has re-
5. Professor Terry recognized that the question of whether the same rules should ap-
ply to all MDPs was a threshold question, and recommended that they should apply. Laurel
S. Terry, A Primer on MDPS: Should the "No"Rule Become a New Rule?. 72 TEMP. L. REv. 869, 892
& 952 (1999). Cf Cone, supra note 3, at 3; David Luban, Asking the Right Questions, 72 TEMP.
L. REv. 839, 840 (1999). Professor John Dzienkowski, in his written testimony before the
MDP Commission, said that he thought broad rules would allow for different types of MDPs
to develop. See Written Testimony of Professor John Dzienkowski, University of Texas School
of Law, to ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 5, 1999), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/dzienkowski.html (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform). This Article suggests this be done in the reverse order-create a
narrow rule, and expand it over time.
6. The phrases "Main Street MDP" and "Wall Street MDP" appear to have been
coined by Laurel S. Terry. See Terry, supra note 5, at 882-83.
7. George C. Harris & Derek F. Foran, The Ethics of Middle-Class Access to Legal Services
and What We Can Learn from the Medical Profession's Shift to a Corporate Paradigm, 70 FORDHAM
L. REv. 775, 776 (2001). See also Dzienkowski, supra note 5; Russ Alan Prince, Advice for Advi-
sors, TRUSTS & EsTATEs,July 2002, at 19-20.
8. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) ("There must be power in the states and the nation to remould [sic], through
experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and eco-
nomic needs.").
9, 63% of the private practice bar in this nation consists of firms of 1-5 attorneys. Tes-
timony of Robert L. Ostertag, Chair, Senior Lawyer Committee of the ABA General Practice,
Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners Section, before the ABA Comm. on Multidisciplinary
Practice (Oct. 9, 1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ostertag.html (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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jected any new rule that would permit lawyers to practice in multid-
isciplinary organizations. Legend has it that when the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct were debated in 1983 and a rule permit-
ting MDPs was proposed, an ABA delegate questioned whether
permitting lawyers to share legal fees would mean that Sears, Roe-
buck could open up a law office. When there was an affirmative
response, the debate ended and MDPs were rejected.15 More re-
cently, in 1999 and 2000, the ABA rejected its own MDP
Commission's recommendations to permit MDPs."
The nail in the MDP coffin, according to some commentators,
was the role that Arthur Andersen, one of the formerly "Big Five"
accounting firms, played in the downfall of Enron Corporation.
The involvement of Arthur Andersen, which employed thousands
of lawyers to deliver consulting services to its clients, in the deba-
cle, led many to predict the demise of the MDP concept.' 2 This
prediction was widespread despite a lack of any evidence that An-
dersen lawyers who were serving Andersen's clients, i.e. lawyers not
serving as corporate counsel, were guilty of misconduct.
3
The ABA rejected MDPs because "[t]he sharing of legal fees
with non-lawyers and the ownership and control of the practice of
law by non-lawyers are inconsistent with the core values of the legal
profession." 4 The core values identified by the ABA House of
Delegates were:
10. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
§ 5.4:102 (2d ed. Supp. 1998).
11. See infra notes 25-46, and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Robert G. Seidenstine, Multi-Disciplinary Practices: Will the Issue Go Away , 11
N.J. LAW. WKLY. NEWSPAPER, May 31, 2002, at 933;Judi Russell, Enron Scandal Clouds Future of
Professional Team-Ups, NEW ORLEANS CITY Bus., Apr. 22, 2002, at 31; Mark Schauerte &
Nathaniel Hernandez, Enron Throws Fuel on Hot Debate Over Multidisciplinary Practices, CHI.
I.AW., Mar. 28, 2002, at 1; Geanne Rosenberg, The Enron Implosion: Scandal Seen as Blow to
Outlook for MDP NAT'L L.J., Jan. 21, 2002, at Al; Brenda Sandburg, Enron Accounting Scandal
Seen as Damaging to MDPs, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 24, 2002, at 5. See also Charles W. Wolfram,
Comparative Multi-Disciplinary Practice of Law: Paths Taken and Not Taken, 52 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 961,984-86 (2002).
13. Ward Bower, MDP Isn't the Poblem, NAT'L .J., Mar. 11, 2002, at A21. The convic-
tion of Andersen for obstruction ofjustice was based, by juror accounts, on the conduct of
Andersen's in-house counsel, whose client was Andersen itself, not Andersen's clients. Thus,
the ethical issue, if one existed, involved the duties of corporate counsel, which are not
germane to the MDP issue. Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Trial Yields Evidence in Enron's Fall, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 2002, at 1. See also Susan P. Koniak, Who Gave Lawyers a Pass? FORBES, Aug.
12, 2002, at 58. According to some, the "last gasp of air" was the ABA approval in August
2002 of Model Rule 7.2 which permits referral agreements between lawyers and non-lawyers.
This new rule is intended as a substitute for MDPs. William Freivogel & Lucian Pera, ETHICS
& LAWYERING TODAY, Sept. 2002, available at http://ethicsandlawyering.com/Issues/
0902.htm (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
14. ABA Recommendation ]OF (July 2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
mdprecoml0f.html (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
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a. the lawyer's duty of undivided loyalty to the client;
b. the lawyer's duty competently to exercise inde-
pendent legal judgment for the benefit of the
client;
c. the lawyer's duty to hold client confidences invio-
late;
d. the lawyer's duty to avoid conflicts of interest with
the client; and
e. the lawyer's duty to help maintain a single profes-
sion of law with responsibilities as a representative
of clients, an officer of the legal system, and a pub-
lic citizen having special responsibility for the
quality ofjustice.
f. The lawyer's duty to promote access tojustce. 15
This Article argues that many of those "core values," particularly
loyalty, competence, and access to justice, would be promoted by
Main Street MDPs without seriously threatening other core values
identified by the ABA, such as independent judgment, confidenti-
ality, and avoidance of conflicts of interest. The challenge is to
define productive and ethical multidisciplinary practice while
avoiding both the threat to ethical practice created by allowing
large law firms to expand uncontrollably as they try to compete
with the large accounting firms, and the distasteful notion of pick-
ing up a divorce at Wal-Mart.
Part I of this Article briefly recounts the history and current
status of the MDP debate. Part II discusses justifications for the
Main Street MDP and the separate and distinct nature of its poten-
tial contributions. Part III suggests the principal elements of a rule
permitting Main Street MDPs, and Part IV offers some concluding
thoughts.
PART I
This Part recounts the history of the MDP debate within the
American Bar Association and among lawyers and scholars who
study this issue. It also briefly recounts the States' approach to
MDPs, which seem to indicate some willingness to experiment with
this form of practice.
15. Id. See also Harris & Foran, supra note 7, at 778.
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A. Background to MDPs
The history and current status of the MDP debate has been re-
counted recently and frequently, so a short summary will suffice.1
6
In 1928, the ABA added Canons 33 through 35 to the original
Canons of Professional Ethics. These provisions prohibited fee
sharing and partnering with non-lawyers if the partnership prac-
ticed law. Canons 33 through 35 also prohibited lawyers from being
employed by non-lawyers for the purpose of serving clients other
than the employer.'7 When the ABA adopted the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility in 1969, it included DR 3-102 and DR 3-
103, which prohibited lawyers and non-lawyers from sharing legal
fees or forming a partnership "if any of the activities of the part-
nership consist of the practice of law."' 8 DR 5-107 continued the
prohibition against lawyers being employed by non-lawyers or al-
lowing non-lawyers to influence their professional judgment."9
In 1983, the Kutak Commission, which drafted the new Model
Rules of Professional Conduct to replace the Model Code, pro-
posed a rule that would have lifted the prohibition on fee sharing
and partnering with non-lawyers, subject only to the caveat that the
arrangement not interfere with the lawyer's duties of independent
judgment, confidentiality, appropriate advertising, and avoidance
of improper fees.20 However, the "fear of Sears," as described above,
led to the defeat of the Kutak proposal; and Model Rule 5.4 was
adopted instead '
Model Rule 5.4: Professional Independence of a Lawyer states,
in pertinent part:
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a
non-lawyer.. .2
16. See, e.g., Daly, supra note 2; John S. Dzienkowski & RobertJ. Peroni, Multidiscipli-
nary Practice and the American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of
Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 83 (2000); Terry, supra note 5;
Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 531
(1994).
17. Harris & Foran, supra note 7, at 779.
18. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-103(A) (1980).
19. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107(C) (1980).
20. STEPHEN GILLERS & Roy D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS, STATUTES AND
STANDARDS 305 (2002); Terry, supra note 5, at 875-76.
21. Terry, supra note 5, at 876-77; Cramton, supra note 16, at 577.
22. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2002). The exceptions in sections
(a) (1)-(3) refer to short-term arrangements involving payments to an estate following the
death of a lawyer or the purchase of a law practice after the death or disappearance of a
lawyer. The rule also provides that non-lawyers can share in compensation or retirement
[VOL. 37:1
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(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a non-
lawyer if any of the activities of the partnership con-
sist of the practice of law....
(c) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a
professional corporation or association authorized
to practice law for a profit, if:
(1) a non-lawyer owns any interest therein...
(2) a non-lawyer is a corporate director or officer
thereof; or
(3) a non-lawyer has the right to direct or control the
professional judgment of a lawyer.
Every state adopting the Model Rules adopted this rule in rele-
vant part. The ABA did not substantially revisit the subject until
1998.4 In 1998, ABA President Philip S. Andersen appointed the
MDP Commission and gave it a mandate to "study and report on
the extent to which and the manner in which professional service
firms operated by accountants and others who are not lawyers are
seeking to provide legal services to the public.",25 The mandate in-
structed the commission to address whether it would be in the
public interest to modify the ethical rules governing the provision
of legal services by professional service firms.26
Following this mandate, the primary focus of the MDP Commis-
sion and of the testimony before it was on the advisability of
permitting lawyers to dispense legal advice to clients while working
for large business organizations, like the (formerly) "Big Five" ac-
counting firms. Concomitantly, the MDP Commission considered
whether it would be consistent with lawyers' ethical obligations if
law firms could open up partnerships to non-lawyers, particularly
accountants and financial planners.
The primary focus on these issues was not surprising, because it
was competition on a national and global scale from the account-
ing firms that provided the impetus for the MDP Commission in
plans that might technically violate the rule. 5.4(a) (4) was recently adopted by the ABA and
allows sharing of court-awarded fees with non-profit organizations.
23. Id. The few states that still adhere to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
retained the language of DR 3-102 and DR 3-103.
24. The ABA did approve, in 1994, a rule allowing lawyers to partner with non-lawyers
to deliver non-legal, "ancillary," services. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.7, infra
notes 172-174, and accompanying text.
25. ABA COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, REPORTER'S NOTES, Appen-
dix C, at 1 (1999) available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/MDPappendixc.html (on file with
the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform) [hereinafter Appendix C].
26. Id.
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the first place. 7 Beginning with Germany after World War II,
European countries increasingly embraced MDPs as accounting
firms expanded to serve their large corporate clients with a mix of
financial and legal advice s.2 The accounting firms hired thousands
of lawyers, so that branches of some of the largest U.S. accounting
firms currently comprise some of the largest law firms in Europe.29
The ABA's decision to study the issue was therefore motivated in
part by a fear that large, corporate, clients were ready to look
abroad for integrated services prohibited here. In the United
States, lawyers working for accounting firms continue to avoid dis-
ciplinary reproach by claiming that they are "practicing tax," or
"consulting," not practicing law, and are therefore not violating
their obligations under the ethics rules.3' Much of this practice may
violate the prohibition on sharing fees, but enforcement has been
virtually nonexistent.
3 2
The scholarly literature has mirrored this concern with account-
ing firms and focuses mainly on the issue of whether lawyers could
maintain their ethical standards while serving as employees or
partners of accountants and other financial planners in large busi-
ness organizations or law firms. The scholarly literature barely
mentions the potential benefits of Main Street MDPs, although
there does seem to be some consensus that Main Street MDPs
would not present ethical problems as often or as serious as the
27. Michael V. Bourland & W. Marc McDonald, Multidisciplinary Practice: Challenges and
Opportunities--Alternative Models and Client Service Opportunities, SG020 ALI-ABA 523, 531
(2001) (American Law Institute-American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education,
ALI-ABA Course of Study, July 5-7, 2001, Estate Planning for the Family Business Owner-
apparently an article based on a paper presented by Bourland in 2000); G. Ellis Duncan, The
Rise of Multidisciplinary Practices in Europe and the Future of the Global Legal Profession Following
ArthurAndersen v. Netherlands BarAss'n, 9 TUL.J. INT'L & COMp. L. 537, 554 (2001);Joseph L.
Kociubes, et al., Boston Bar Association Task Force on Multi-Disciplinary Practice: Interim Report on
Multi-Disciplinay Practice, BOSTON BJ., Sept./Oct. 2000, at 4.
28. Duncan, supra note 27, at 541-42.
29. Id.
30. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 16, at 88.
31. Terry, supra note 5, at 881.
32. See Wolfram, supra note 12, at 969; Daly, supra note 2, at 258 (noting dismissal of
investigation into prosecution of one of the "Big Five" accounting firms for unauthorized
practice of law in Texas).
33. See, e.g., Daly, supra note 2; Duncan, supra note 27, at 541-42; Dzienkowski & Per-
oni, supra note 16; LawrenceJ. Fox, Old Wine in Old Bottles: Preserving Professional Independence,
72 TEMP. L. REv. 971 (1999);John D. Messina, Lawyer + Layman: A Recipe for Disaster! Why the
Ban on MDP Should Remain, 62 U. PITT. L. REv. 367 (2000); Adam A. Shulenburger, Note,
Would you Like Fries With That? The Future of Multidisciplinary Practices, 87 IowA L. REv. 327
(2001). Cf Cone, supra note 3, at 5-6 (noting the "preoccupation with business form" in the
MDP debate); Terry, supra note 5, at 882.
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"Wall Street" variety would. 4 Professor David Luban has suggested
that were it not for the ethical issues that arise when lawyers are
employed by large accounting firms, which compete with law firms,
the ABA would never have gotten involved in the MDP debate.
5
Just as a major scientific discoveries are often made while the
scientist is looking for something else, the preoccupation with
accountants37 in the study of the MDP phenomenon has revealed
information about and demand for a different and more fruitful
category of MDPs that is worth exploring-the Main Street MDP. 3s
Yet despite significant testimony concerning the practicability of
and demand for Main Street MDPs, the MDP Commission treated
the various types of MDPs together, thus enabling the ABA to
throw out the Main Street baby with the Wall Street bath water.
The MDP Commission spent two years studying the issue and
holding hearings. To facilitate discussion, it proposed five possible
models for law practice that involved non-lawyers, ranging from
the "cooperative model" in which the lawyer works with non-lawyer
professionals that the lawyer or client employs (a model that is cur-
rently permitted in all 50 states) ,3 to the "fully integrated model"
in which lawyers and non-lawyers could be partners in a firm that
provided both legal and non-legal services. °
In 1999, the MDP Commission recommended to the ABA that it
adopt the fully integrated model. In making this recommendation,
the MDP Commission was mindful of what it identified as the "core
values" of the legal profession: "independence of professional
judgment, the protection of confidential client information, and
loyalty to the client through the avoidance of conflict of inter-
ests." 4' The MDP Commission suggested that these values were best
34. ABA COMM'N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELE-
GATES 2 (2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpfinalrep2000.html (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter 2000 Report].
35. Luban, supra note 5, at 840 ("The debate has never been about how best to help
Mom and Dad plan their retirement. It is about high-end lawyers who want to merge with
other high-end financial professionals to compete more effectively for the business of the
Masters of the Universe.").
36. See generally ROYSTON M. ROBERTS, SERENDIPITY: ACCIDENTAL DISCOVERIES IN SCI-
ENCE 159-64 (1989) (discussing Dr. Fleming's discovery of penicillin).
37. Lawrence Fox, for example, who offers some of the most caustic criticism of MDPs,
focuses almost exclusively on the accounting firms. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 33.
38. Professor Terry recognized this as an unintended consequence. Terry, supra note 5,
at 882-83. See also Appendix C, supra note 25.
39. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 16, at 131.
40. Appendix C, supra note 25, at 2-3. These models and their relative merits are dis-
cussed at length in Daly, supra note 2.
41. Appendix C, supra note 25, at 7.
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preserved through regulation rather than prohibition of MDPs.
42
The Commission recommended that MDPs be subject to the same
ethical constraints as law firms and be regulated through a certifi-
cation process by the state bars.43 It also proposed that MDPs
controlled by non-lawyers should abide by more stringent regula-
tion than lawyer-controlled MDPs.44 At the ABA annual meeting in
August 1999, these recommendations were tabled pending further
study. The MDP Commission held more hearings and subsequently
revised its proposals, placed more emphasis on the need to pre-
serve the core values of the profession and the need to give lawyers
"control and authority necessary to assure lawyer independence,"
but retained its recommendation of fully integrated MDPs. 45 At its
meeting in July 2000, the ABA House of Delegates rejected those
recommendations, adopted a resolution that reaffirmed the core
values of the legal profession and its longstanding opposition to
MDPs, and disbanded the MDP Commission.46
B. Objections to MDPS
Competing views have emerged to explain the ABA's summary
rejection of MDPs in the face of their growing importance in
Europe and what many suggest is their inevitability in the United
States.47 One view is that the ABA was genuinely concerned with
the very real ethical dilemmas that could arise in MDPs. Others
contend that the ABA was more concerned with the economic well-
being of lawyers and viewed MDPs as threatening the monopoly of
legal services.
Many potential ethical pitfalls of MDPs exist. One concern is
that non-lawyers in the MDP would inappropriately influence law-
yers' professional judgment and independence by exerting
pressure on lawyers to eschew their best legal judgment in favor of
42. Id.
43. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 16, at 132.
44. Id. at 132-33.
45. 2000 Report, supra note 34, at 1 (2000). The "control and authority" language was
discussed in the report to the House of Delegates, but largely left to the states to define. Id.
46. The ABA House of Delegates adopted Resolution IOF, proposed jointly by the state
bars of Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Florida, Ohio, Erie County, and Cuyahoga County,
ABA, supra note 14. See also Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 16, at 179-80.
47. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 16, at 90; Oral Remarks of Sidney Traum, Miami
lawyer-CPA practitioner, to ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 4, 1999), avail
able at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/traum.html (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
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the bottom line.48 Another serious concern is the prospect of both
defining and dealing with the complex conflicts of interests that
would arise in business organizations with thousands of employees
offering varying services, only some of which would be legal ser-
vices.49
Others have expressed concern that the varying duties of confi-
dentiality and avoidance of conflicts of interest between lawyers
and other professionals would interfere with the stricter duties of
lawyers and ultimately mislead and harm clients. Lawrence Fox, a
Philadelphia lawyer and active member of the ABA, is one of the
most vociferous critics of MDPs. He contends that they are danger-
ous and would deliver a mortal blow to the profession.5 0 Fox points
to the attest function of auditors, which requires public disclosure
of what might be confidential information if acquired by a lawyer.5'
Fox has accused accountants of having conflicts of interest rules
that are "loosey-goosey," and far more relaxed than those of law-
yers, because they recognize conflicts only when clients are on
opposite sides of the same matter. 2 To make his point about inde-
pendent judgment, Fox simply points to the advent of HMOs and
the loss of professional independence to doctors.
The MDP Commission's 2000 recommendations addressed these
issues and suggested ways to ensure that lawyers practicing in MDPs
would not fall into these ethical pitfalls. On the question of inde-
pendent judgment, the MDP Commission recommended the
creation of law departments within large MDPs where lawyers
alone would supervise other lawyers directly.54 Interestingly, the re-
port noted that this would likely be less of a problem in small
MDPs where practitioners have already developed methods of
keeping legal and non-legal advice separate." It has also been
48. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 16, at 179-80; see also Written Testimony of Gary
T. Johnson to the ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice (Oct. 8, 1999), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/johnson.html (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform).
49. Fox, supra note 33, at 975-77; see also Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 16, at 135.
50. Fox, supra note 33.
51. Id. at 973-74
52. Id. at 976. Charles Wolfram referred to Fox's comments as "laughable in any forum
but a gathering of lawyers." See alsoWolfram, supra note 12, at 974.
53. Fox, supra note 33, at 972. But see generally Harris & Foran, supra note 7, at 820 (ar-
guing that although managed care has its downside, overall it has not affected the quality of
medical care, in part because of the incentives created by doctors' ethical duties and liability
rules).
54. 2000 Report, supra note 34, at 2.
55. Id. This point was recently reiterated by Professor Brustin in the context of non-
profit public interest organizations that offer legal and non-legal services. See also Stacy L.
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noted that these same arguments about interference with profes-
sional judgment were once made in opposition to in-house counsel
and pre-paid legal plans, which are now universally accepted as le-
56gitimate practice settings.
On the issue of confidentiality and conflicts of interest, the MDP
Commission noted that the duties of different types of profession-
als might vary, and put the onus on the lawyer both to explain this
variation to the clients and to guard against impairment of confi-
dentiality or the attorney-client privilege. While lawyers already
share confidences with non-lawyers such as secretaries, paralegals,
and clerks, it is the lawyer's duty to ensure that the non-lawyers do
not reveal confidences:. 8 The MDP Commission did not suggest
any changes to the conflicts rules, noting that the rules that cur-
rently apply to law firms would apply to MDPs. 9 The MDP
Commission also recommended that the same entity should not be
allowed to give legal advice to and perform audits for the same cli-
ent.6
Others have suggested that economic protectionism and self-
interest were driving the ABA's wholesale rejection of MDPs.6' If
MDPs were allowed, accounting firms and banks would accelerate
their own growth and would out-perform most law firms. Typically,
law firms lack both established organizational forms for providing
an array of services, and the access to capital enjoyed by large ac-
counting firms and financial institutions that can take advantage of
capital markets for growth. 2 Professors Dzienkowski and Peroni
have suggested that some leaders of the bar "prefer to bury their
heads in the sand and return to the imagined golden years, when
Brustin, Legal Services Provision Through Multidisciplinary Practice--Encouraging Holistic Advocacy
While Protecting Ethical Interests, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 787 (2002).
56. Daly, supra note 40, at 271.
57. 2000 Report, supra note 34, at 5.
58. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3, cmt. 1-2; Statement of Professor
John Dzienkowski, University of Texas School of Law, to ABA Comm'n on Multidisiplinary
Practice (Apr. 8, 1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/dzienkowski2.html (on file
with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
59. 2000 Report, supra note 34, at 6.
60. Id.
61. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 16, at 89; Tia Breakley, Note, Multidisciplinary
Practices: Lawyers & Accountants Under One Roof?, 2000 COLUM. Bus. L REV. 275, 288 (2000).
62. It has been suggested that, in tandem with permitting MDPs, law firms should be
permitted to have passive investors, but these suggestions have faired even less well than
MDPs and their relative merits are beyond the scope of this Article. The MDP Commission
specifically recommended prohibiting passive investment in MDPs in its 2000 recommenda-
tions. See 2000 Report, supra note 34.
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the practice of law was viewed as a profession, rather than a busi-
ness.
" 63
C. The States' Response to MDPs
Whatever the reasons, the MDP debate at the national level in
the ABA appears to be over, for now. But regulation of the legal
profession is done at the state level, with the ABA's role confined to
suggesting model rules in the hopes of both influencing substance
and achieving uniformity. It is ultimately the States that will deter-
mine whether MDPs are permissible. Study and debate about
multidisciplinary practice at the State level has proceeded apace
despite the ABA's rejection of MDPs in 1999 and 2000.
As of April 2003, all but six state bar associations or state su-
preme courts had created task forces that have studied or are
currently studying the MDP issue. While 17 task forces have issued
reports favorable to MDPs, only 3 state bars have come out formally
in favor of MDPs. 65 Nineteen state bars or courts have formally re-
jected MDPs.6 The rest of the states, regardless of the view of the
task force that studied the issue, have taken less definitive action,
such as deferring votes or recommending further study. It appears
63. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 16, at 88. See generally Bruce A. Green, The Disci-
plinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice: Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some
Implications for the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1115 (2000).
64. The states that have not addressed the MDP issue are Alaska, Hawaii, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Nevada, and Vermont. ABA, MDP Information (Apr. 2003), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/MDP-state-summ.html (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
65. The state bar associations that rejected the pro-MDP position of their own task
forces are Indiana, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia. Even among this
group, not all of the decisions appear final. In Utah, for example, the Utah Supreme Court
showed a willingness to revisit the issue in the future if other jurisdictions adopt MDPs and
can provide useful information. Id.
66. These states are Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas,
Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
67. According to the ABA website that tracks this information, at least 19 state bars
have not taken a final position on MDPs. Delaware, for example, has taken the position that
if the ABA changes its position on MDPs, it will also reconsider. Connecticut has received a
report recommending no changes to the rules, but continues its study of the issue. States
including Arizona, California, Georgia, Michigan, and Wisconsin have either specifically
deferred voting on the issue or put the matter on a future agenda. States including Ala-
bama, Connecticut, Iowa, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Washington have task forces that
either have not completed their study or have taken the position that, in a general way, they
will continue to study the issue. Id.
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that only Idaho and Mississippi disbanded their task forces without• 6,
a recommendation.8 Although only one state bar association, 9 in
addition to the District of Columbia bar association, has formally
approved the MDP concept, the majority of state bars have indi-
cated a willingness to listen and learn from further study and the
experience of others. Like the MDP Commission of the ABA, the
state bar task forces that studied MDPs focused on the accountant
problem in large firms and did not consider the very different na-
ture of the Main Street MDp.
70
PART II
This Part explores the demand for Main Street MDPs, and ar-
gues that permitting them would be a productive and low-risk
experiment that might shed light on the merit and feasibility of
MDPs in general. The evidence for this comes from solo and small
firm practitioners as well as representatives of consumer groups
who have testified before the ABA Commission, from the few
scholars and commentators who have addressed the issue, and
from law school clinics and legal aid organizations around the
country that have run successful MDPs. This Part will discuss the
demand for Main Street MDPs from clients and lawyers alike. It will
then argue, by analogy to non-profit MDPs, that Main Street MDPs
are practicable and can be structured in a way that minimizes the
risks of unethical practice.
68. Id.
69. The Board of Governors of the Colorado State Bar Association has adopted a reso-
lution supporting MDPs. Id.
70. Little evidence in the state MDP committee reports indicates that smaller firms
were considered in whether to alter the ethics rules pertaining to MDPs. Many committees
only recognized the impact on large firms and their association with accounting firms, fi-
nancial institutions, and insurance companies. See Report of the Ohio State Bar Ass'n
Council of Delegates on Multidisciplinary Practice and The Legal Profession, Apr. 2000;
Connecticut Bar Ass'n Study Committee on Multidiscipline Practice Report, May 2000;
Oklahoma Board of Governors Report on Multidisciplinary Practice, Feb. 2002; Tennessee
Bar Ass'n Report from the Multidisciplinary Committee, Feb. 2000; Utah State Bar Multidis-
ciplinary Task Force Report, Nov. 2000; Report of the Joint Comm'n of the Virginia State
Bar and Virginia Bar Ass'n on Multidisciplinary Practice (MDP), Oct. 2001.
71. Id. Much of this is summarized in the MDP Commission Reporter's Notes submit-
ted along with the 1999 Recommendation to the ABA.
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A. Client Demand
To the extent that it was addressed, those testifying before the
MDP Commission strongly agreed that significant demand for
MDPs existed and that Main Street MDPs would not present ethical
problems as widespread or as serious as those presented by the
Wall Street variety.72 In fact, the testimony stressed the improve-
ments in counseling, cost, and client comfort that Main Street
MDPs could offer over traditional law firms. 73 The representatives
of consumer groups that testified before the MDP Commission
were in favor of MDPs and the Commission itself noted that:
The testimony before the commission by consumer groups of-
fered overwhelming support for the proposition that
individual clients need integrated professional advice on any
number of areas, including estate-planning, small business
counseling, accounting, and regulatory compliance. In the
consumer groups' collective opinion, a dual practice model
cannot meet these pressing needs. 4
Some of those who testified focused on the innovative ways that
smaller practices could create MDPs that offered efficient and ef-
fective one-stop shopping.75 With a smaller MDP, clients could get
all of their needs met by one firm and for less cost than if they had
to seek out independent professionals to deal with each of their
needs. This would be true for individual clients as well as small
businesses.
Witnesses offered substantial testimony before the MDP Com-
mission about client demand for one-stop shopping,77 particularly
future demand once consumers became aware that they could go
to a coordinated group of professionals to, for example, buy a
home, build a home, plan their estate, adopt a child, or start a
72. Statement of Neil Cochran, Chairman, Dundas & Wilson, to ABA Comm'n on Mul-
tidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 4, 1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/cochranl.html
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Terry, supra note 5, at 882-
83.
73. See, e.g., Cochran, supra note 72; Daly, supra note 2.
74. Appendix C, supra note 25, at 6-8.
75. See, e.g., Summary of the Testimony of M. Elizabeth Wall, Group Director of Legal
and Regulatory Affairs, Cable & Wireless PLC, to ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Prac-
tice, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/wall1198.html (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
76. Haddon, supra note 3, at 516.
77. Dzienkowski, supra note 58.
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small business.78 MDPs could offer more efficient and complete
service at lower overall cost to the consumer, undoubtedly some-
thing for which there is great demand.7 :' Professor Daly summed up
the range of possibilities:
An MDP will allow the Main Street lawyer to offer the small
business client 'one-stop-shopping' for advice in a wide range
of areas, including dispute resolution, tax, technology, busi-
ness planning, environmental regulation compliance, and
human resources. Individual clients will have the benefit of
'one-stop-shopping' for personal life-style decisions that ne-
cessitate legal, financial, and psychological decision-making,
such as estate planning, divorce, child custody matters, and
juvenile criminal charges."
Legal problems do not exist in a vacuum but rather in the con-
text of other problems and complex relationships. For example,
one issue that divorce lawyers sometimes face is a client who, in a
rush of guilt and avoidance, wants to accept a settlement from a
spouse that the lawyer is convinced the client will later regret when
the dust settles, the guilt subsides, and financial reality sets in.8 ' If
the client were sitting not only with a lawyer, but also with a finan-
cial planner and a social worker, the client would, through joint
counseling about the ramifications of the decision, be more likely
to do what is in her own long-term best interest. Lawyers, for the
most part, simply are not trained to offer the kind of effective and
compassionate advice that is necessary in such circumstances, even
though some may succeed on occasion. Under current rules, if the
client wants counseling on the various aspects of the divorce, she
must seek out three different professionals in three separate ap-
pointments, and the three advisors typically would not know what
the others were counseling. The social worker, for example, might
not realize that the client could get a larger settlement and would
not know to address that issue.
There was very specific testimony before the Commission that
highlighted the demand for MDPs in the area of disability and spe-
78. Weber, supra note 4.
79. Cochran, supra note 72;James W.Jones, Focusing the MDP Debate: Historical and Prac-
tical Perspectives, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 989, 993-94 (1999). See also Jim Grote, Multidisciplinary
Practices: Emerging Slowly ... Very Slowly, 15 J. FIN. PLANNING 52 (Apr. 1, 2002) (discussing
demand from wealthy families for social workers when writing estate plans).
80. Daly, supra note 2, at 282.
81. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS
102 (6th ed., Aspen 2002).
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cial education. Phillip Stinson, a lawyer with a four-attorney firm
based in Philadelphia and Delaware that specializes in legal issues
involving disabled children, testified that his advocacy on behalf of
his clients would be improved if he did not have to maintain an
"arm's-length" relationship with the psychologists whose help is
necessary to advocate on behalf of his clients. Because lawyers and
psychologists have to work so closely in order to advocate effec-
tively for children before school boards and administrative
agencies, the ability to partner and offer integrated services would,
according to this witness, improve outcomes."2
Evidence of client demand for integrated services exists in the
estate-planning area as well. Financial planning firms that serve
affluent clients are already offering multidisciplinary services to
clients, including hiring social workers to counsel wealthy families
on dealing with affluence both before and after death.8 3 Another
firm that offers multidisciplinary financial services to individuals
and families states on its website that part of the "team" from which
the client will benefit includes an attorney:
Vogel Financial Advisors offers an array of advisory services
designed to address the major areas of personal and business
financial management including investment management, es-
tate planning, risk management, and income tax and cash
flow planning. Because we coordinate the efforts of the advi-
sory team (CPA, attorney, and insurance agent) in these areas,
clients benefit from an integrated, systematic approach to fi-
nancial management.1
4
The website fails to mention that, because of the ethical prohibi-
tion on lawyers working for non-lawyers and sharing fees, the
attorney does not in fact practice as an attorney in the firm and
that the firm out-sources its preparation of legal documents. 5 This
arguably misleading statement on the website indicates that finan-
cial planning firms perceive client demand for coordinated legal
82. Statement of Philip Matthew Stinson, Sr. to ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary
Practice (Oct. 9, 1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/stinson.html (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
83. Grote, supra note 79, at 54. Some firms with less than fifty employee-professionals
offer multidisciplinary services to wealthy clients. See, e.g., Tanager Financial Services website,
at http://www.tanagerfinancial.com; Charles D. Haines, Inc., website, at http://www.
charlesdhaines.com.
84. Vogel Financial Advisors website, available at http://www.vfaonline.com/
Advisors/vfaonline (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
85. Grote, supra note 79.
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and financial advice. The founder of this firm, and others like it,
maintain that their creation and success are due to client demand
for mixed services.8 6
The demand for this type of service in the estate-planning area is
so significant that in June 2000, two lawyers who specialize in estate
planning founded the Academy of Multidisciplinary Practice. Its
purpose is to offer information and support to professionals in the
estate-planning field, including lawyers, who want to collaborate
with other professionals to offer integrated estate-planning services
to clients. Through its website, it offers educational courses and
tools accredited by the Estate and Wealth Strategies Institute at
Michigan State University. 7 This group focuses on helping estate-
planning professionals collaborate within the confines of the legal
ethics rules that prohibit fee sharing. They offer advice, for exam-
ple, on how lawyers can collaborate with insurance professionals to
offer integrated financial and estate plans to clients without shar-
ing fees or otherwise violating state ethics rules."'
In addition to providing more effective and efficient services
through MDPs, evidence presented to the MDP Commission indi-
cated that the MDP form would be less intimidating to potential
clients and might lead more people with legal problems to seek
appropriate help. The Commission itself noted that MDPs might
be more "user-friendly" in part because one might initially go to an
MDP for non-legal reasons but then have easy access to a lawyer
when the legal aspect of a problem became apparent. 9 Professors
Harris and Foran argue that MDPs can help deal with a lack of in-
formation:
[A]nother important barrier to middle-class access to legal
services [is] lack of information. Unlike high-wealth individu-
als and corporations, middle-class consumers often simply do
not recognize their legal needs or, if recognized, do not know
how to go about meeting them.90
86. Id.
87. See The Academy of Multidisciplinary Practice website, available at
http://www.MDPacademy.com.
88. Renno L. Peterson & David K. Cahoone, How to Work Ethically with other Profession-
als, BROKER WORLD, Sept. 2002.
89. Statement of Theodore Debro, Chairman, Consumers for Affordable and Reliable
Services of Alabama, to ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 12, 2000), available
at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/debro2.html (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform).
90. Harris & Foran, supra note 7, at 802.
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One consumer advocate testified before the MDP Commission
that many people are intimidated by lawyers and visit a lawyer only
as a last resort." He suggested that offering legal services in con-
junction with other relevant services would recast lawyers as
problem solvers rather than adversaries. 92 Moreover, low- and mod-
erate-income people are more likely to go to non-lawyers, such as
social workers, with their problems.93 If social workers could prac-
tice in Main Street MDPs, clients who initially seek out non-lawyers
for help would benefit if they could receive legal advice simultane-
ously.94 By offering to low- and middle-income clients the types of
networks now available only to the wealthy and eliminating or re-
ducing the intimidation factor at the same time, more people
would have more of their legal needs met.95
The point is not that MDPs would always provide services that
are superior to those of law firms, but that clients, particularly low-
income clients for whom it might be more cost effective to seek
services in an MDP, should be permitted to choose to receive legal
services through multidisciplinary practices.
Creating a practice in which the participants develop a process
and a culture for working together has its own distinct value. This
explains why the contract model, whereby a law firm contracts with
another professional firm to offer ad hoc, coordinated, but non-
exclusive services to clients, is inadequate. 96 In working together on
a client matter, the lawyer would have to be very careful about re-
vealing confidences and would need consent for any such
revelations. 7 Perhaps most importantly, as Professor Dzienkowski
stated in his testimony before the MDP Commission, the quality of
advice a client could get from a true "team" is likely to be far supe-




95. Weber, supra note 4. Weber noted, for example, that about half of the adults in this
country do not have written wills. See also Oral Testimony of Wayne Moore, Director of Legal
Advocacy Group American Ass'n for Retired Persons, to ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary
Practice (Mar. 11, 1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/moorel.html (discussing
surveys that show the majority of low and moderate income people who could benefit from
a lawyer do not use one) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform);
Debro, supra note 89 (citing statistics indicating that low and moderate income people do
not seek out lawyers when they should); Haddon, supra note 3, at 520.
96. New York adopted a rule in 2001 that permits strategic alliances allowing lawyers
and non-lawyers to jointly market and make referrals to each other. New York Code of Prof'l
Responsibility DR 1-107 [1200.5-c] (2002).
97. Wolfram, supra note 12, at 967.
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rior than from an ad hoc affiliation. In a team setting, the non-
lawyers would educate the lawyers about their fields, whether it be
financial planning or social work:
[A] common partnership fosters a shared culture and pro-
duces a consistently high work product with uniform
attention to professional standards. One firm creates a fabric
of mutual dependence, teamwork, and collaborative effort,
rather than an ad hoc approach to client problems.9
B. Lawyer Demand
In addition to client demand, there is evidence of demand for
MDPs by lawyers who practice as solo practitioners and at small
firms. The fact that financial advisors and accountants can partner
and give advice that would be considered legal advice if given by a
lawyer has led many lawyers to feel at a competitive disadvantage. 00
The proliferation of financial firms that bundle financial and es-
tate-planning services lends credence to these concerns.'0 ' Even
without competition from such firms, the opportunity to expand
and improve client service accounts for much of the demand by
lawyers for MDPs.10 This business concern is coupled with an un-
derstanding that counseling clients on non-legal matters can
potentially lead to problems. For example, testimony before the
MDP Commission suggested that, because of the complexity of
many clients' legal problems, particularly the elderly, well inten-
98. Dzienkowski, supra note 58.
99. Id. See also Oral Testimony of Roger Page, Nat'l Director of Merger and Acquisition
Services and of the Washington Nat'l Tax Practice, Deloitte & Touche, LLP, to ABA Comm'n
on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 4, 1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
page2.html (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). See also Wolf-
ram, supra note 12, at 964-66 (describing how current ancillary business options are not
adequate).
100. Written Testimony of Linda Shely, Ethics Counsel, State Bar of Ariz., to ABA
Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/shely2.html
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Others have objected to
MDPs because of the potential effects on small firms. For example, Robert L. Ostertag, a
past president of the New York State Bar who was involved with the ABA's General Practice,
Solo and Small Firm Practitioners Section, testified against Main Street MDPs, fearing they
would be "gobbled up" by the large, one stop-shopping, mega-firms that would develop. He
analogized this phenomenon to the large chain bookstores that have put small booksellers
out of business. See Ostertag, supra note 9. This objection, however, would be satisfied by the
size limit on the MDPs proposed infra section III.
101. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
102. Haddon, supra note 3, at 516.
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tioned lawyers risk offering misguided, non-legal advice that is not
in their clients' best interests.
3
Another condition that might be driving demand by solo and
small firm practitioners for MDPs is the issue of job satisfaction.
Professors Trubek and Farnham, in their discussion of social justice
collaboratives, note the dissatisfaction among lawyers with the sys-
tems in which they work.0 4 Professor Haddon, who sat on the MDP
Commission, reports that many lawyers who have gone to account-
ing firms to "practice tax" preferred the "supportive interdisciplinary
environment" of those firms, where individual professionals were
not isolated in their practice areas but were required to interact in
serving their clients.0°5 Because many lawyers have a background in
the social sciences, it is entirely plausible that those lawyers would
have a basic understanding of their own limitations in advising
their clients and would gain satisfaction by practicing alongside
other professionals.
0 6
C. Public Interest Practice and Law School Clinics
Even if significant demand for Main Street MDPs by lawyers and
clients alike does exist, the question remains whether MDPs are
practicable. One way to measure the practicability of Main Street
MDPs is to look at organizations that already offer multidiscipli-
nary services of which legal advice is one element. Although the
accounting firms that have hired lawyers to "practice tax" are an
example, that type of practice has few similarities to how Main
Street MDPs would function. A closer analogy is found on the
other end of the spectrum. There are MDPs that already exist and
provide insight into the value and practicability of Main Street
MDPs.
103. Id. at 529.
104. LOUISE G. TRUBEK &JENNIFERJ. FARNHAM, How TO CREATE AND SUSTAIN A SUC-
CESSFUL SOCIAL JUSTICE COLLABORATIVE, INNOVATIVE PRACTICES TO EMPOWER PEOPLE OF
LOW AND MODERATE INCOME, A GUIDEBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS, 5 (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) [hereinafter TRUBEK & FARNHAM,
GUIDEBOOK].
105. Haddon, supra note 3, at 516.
106. The most typical undergraduate majors for incoming law students in 2001 were, in
descending order, Political Science, English, Psychology, and Economics. Conversation with
Robert Carr, Senior Statistician, Law School Admission Counsel, Oct. 3, 2002 (notes on file
with author).
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Scattered around the United States are non-profit community
organizations that offer legal assistance as one of their services.
Some law school clinics have partnered with community groups or
other academic departments to offer multidisciplinary services to
low-income and poor clients. °7 Professors Trubek and Farnham
termed these partnerships "social justice collaboratives" and ex-
plained that such collaboration "generally begins either with the
idea that issues outside the legal system are important for resolving
legal issues or with the idea that a social program requires legal
input."'1 These organizations have been virtually invisible in the
MDP debate.'0 9 Whether these groups are violating Model Rule 5.4
is an open question. Some of the language of Model Rule 5.4 is
addressed to lawyers practicing for profit, and experts disagree on
the extent to which non-profits should be exempt from its prohibi-
tions." Professor Brustin has made a cogent and persuasive
argument that this ambiguity in the rules should be clarified, and
that non-profit MDPs should be permitted under the ethics rules
and state laws governing unauthorized practice of law."' The im-
portant point here is that non-profit MDPs have demonstrated
ethical viability and practical benefits which lends support to the
viability of Main Street MDPs."
2
Professor Brustin recently described how non-profit, multidisci-
plinary practices benefit low-income clients." 3 Proponents of Main
Street MDPs suggest similar benefits would occur if MDPs were al-
lowed. One benefit is simply that these organizations are
responsive to the needs of their clients and are very successful at
helping their clients. Professor Brustin describes the complexity of
the problems of the poor and makes a cogent argument for why
one-stop shopping provides these clients with services that are oth-
erwise difficult to obtain. Low-income clients often lack the
knowledge, time, and money to go to different agencies for assis-
tance."' Moreover, their problems are often such that they
simultaneously involve financial, social, and legal aspects that are
107. Brustin, supra note 55, at 796.
108. TRUBEK & FARNHAM, GuIDEBOOK, supra note 104, at 4.
109. Brustin, supra note 55, at 819-20.
110. Id. at 803-07.
111. Id.
112. "Issues of collaboration for social justice groups and business consultancies have
some similarity. The main idea behind both of them is that legal problems cannot be effec-
tively addressed without also addressing nonlegal issues." TRUBEK & FARNHAM, GUIDEBOOK,
supra note 104, at 4.
113. Brustin, supra note 55.
114. This may sometimes be the case not because the cost of accessing other services is
prohibitive, but because it is perceived as such. See Debro, supra note 89.
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better resolved with conscious reference to each other rather than
separately." 5 While this is often the case, clients are not always able
to recognize the legal aspects of their problems, or they may go to
the lawyer not realizing that they need other services as well. Pro-
fessor Brustin gives the example of a client who goes to a lawyer for
a restraining order because of domestic violence. If the lawyer is
practicing within a community center, the client can easily obtain
the counseling and financial advice she might need." G In the con-
text of the child welfare system, the lack of integration can
discourage clients:
One parent described her perception of an apparent lack of
understanding and collaboration between the various parts of
the child welfare system upon which she was dependent. Her
legal and services problems were very integrated, and yet from
this parent's perspective, the professionals involved with these
parts of the system seemed to operate in isolation from each
other."1 7
Non-profit MDPs can also benefit the lawyers and other profes-
sionals who provide the service. Trubek and Farnham found that
lawyers serving low- and moderate-income clients were often over-
whelmed by those clients' non-legal problems and felt ineffective
in resolving them."
8
Non-profit centers that offer legal as well as other services are
not the only entities already acting as MDPs. Some district attor-
neys offices use social workers and doctors as part of a team in
dealing with some situations, such as those involving children who
enter the system because of child abuse." Some jurisdictions have
developed Child Advocacy Centers and other types of family treat-
ment systems that involve lawyers and other professionals to deal
with child abuse and domestic violence issues in a more holistic
120and less adversarial way.
Another type of current MDP practice is law school clinics.
Around the country, a handful of law school clinics are forming
115. Brustin, supra note 55, at 792-93.
116. Id. at 793. See also 2 INTERDISCIPLINARY REPORT ON AT-RISK CHILDREN & FAMILIES
18 (May/June 1999).
117. Ann Moynihan et al., Achieving Justice: Parents and the Child Welfare System: Foreword,
70 FORDHAM L. REv. 287, 331 (2002).
118. TRUBEK & FARNHAM, GUIDEBOOK, supra note 104, at 8.
119. Debro, supra note 89.
120. 2 INTERDISCIPLINARY REPORT ON AT-RISK CHILDREN & FAMILIES 129 (May/June
1999).
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partnerships with other university departments to offer services to
clients. For example, Fordham University sponsors the Interdisci-
plinary Center for Family & Child Advocacy. In the clinic, law
students, social work students, and psychology students work to-
gether to serve clients in the areas of domestic violence, child
abuse/neglect, special education, and disability.
12
1
The HIV/AIDS Law Project, one of the clinical programs at the
University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall) Law School, has
become part of a network that serves HIV infected, low-income
women. The Family Care Network,2 2 housed at a children's hospi-
tal, offers medical care, social services, and legal services to women
who typically enter the Network because of the medical needs of
their children. Through that initial contact, the Network offers
these women medical examinations and treatment, and encour-
ages them to speak with a lawyer who analyzes the client's legal
situation.2 3 The types of legal issues often identified at the assess-
ment interview include government aid to which the client was not
aware she was entitled and the need for will drafting, powers of at-
torney and other estate-planning-related services. 2 4 These clients
would never seek out legal services on their own, either because
they do not realize the legal aspects of their problems or because
they feel intimidated and disempowered.125 But because these cli-
ents do seek out some services, particularly medical services for
their children, the multidisciplinary nature of the agency helps
them recognize and receive the comprehensive services that they
need.
126
Not all law school clinics focus on the family and medical needs
of low-income clients. The George Washington University Law
School operates a clinic that is part of the wider community eco-
nomic development movement, which seeks to improve low-
income communities through the growth of small businesses by
members of those communities. 127 The Small Business Clinic pro-
121. See Interdisciplinary Center for Family & Child Advocacy website, at
http://aw.fordham.edu/htm/ce-fcgra.htm.
122. For a description of the Network, see id.
123. Jeffrey Selbin & Mark Del Monte, A Waiting Room of Their Own: The Family Care Net-
work as a Model for Providing Gender-Specific Legal Services to Women with H!V 5 DUKE J. GENDER
L. & POL'Y 103, 124-25 (1998).
124. Id. at 125. Sometimes lawyers at the Center are able to identify more pressing legal
needs, such as impending evictions, which are often either the result of the failure of the
clients to seek the cash benefits to which they are entitled, or simply discrimination. Id.
125. See Interdisciplinary Graduate Education, supra note 121.
126. Id.
127. See Susan R. Jones, Small Business and Community Economic Development: Transactional
Lauyering for Social Change and Economic Justice, 4 CLINICAL L. Rev. 195, 196 n.2 (1997);
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vides free start-up legal services to Washington, D.C., area entre-
preneurs, nonprofit groups, individual artists and arts
organizations.2 The clinic uses students from the business and en-
gineering schools as well as the law school. These students work
together in teams to address issues ranging from trademark regis-
tration and business models to social cost analysis, production
feasibility, and manufacturing operations.
These clinics (and others around the nation)2 9, offer further evi-
dence of the usefulness of, and potential demand for, Main Street
MDPs. They demonstrate that it is possible for professionals from
different fields to work together to provide comprehensive legal
and non-legal advice to clients, and they demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of that approach. The Berkeley Clinic, for example,
provided legal services to more HIV-infected women during the
first six months after itjoined the Family Care Network than in any
comparable period in the Clinic's previous seven-years. 13
These clinics and community-based service organizations, and
their lawyers in particular, know very well the potential ethical risks
created by their form of practice. They have adopted practices and
procedures intended to prevent the realization of these risks. The
Family Care Network shares client information among its profes-
sionals only if it gets consent from the clients, although it
acknowledges that such consent may not be entirely voluntary be-
cause of lack of other choices that the client has.'
3
1
In a law school clinic at the University of Denver that includes
student social workers, an elaborate memorandum is circulated to
the law students. The memorandum explains that lawyers and so-
cial workers have different duties of confidentiality, and instructs
the students on how to maintain confidentiality if they suspect one
of their clients of child abuse. 132 It explains that the student lawyer
interviewing the client must get consent for the lawyer to share any
information with a social worker. Before getting consent, the stu-
dent lawyer must explain the confidentiality rules and the benefits
and risks of working with a social worker. The student lawyer must
tell the client that the social worker is bound by confidentiality
Louise G. Trubek &JenniferJ. Farnham, Social Justice Collaboratives: Multidisciplinary Practices
for People, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 227, 250-55 (2000).
128. Susan R. Jones, Current Issues in the Changing Roles and Practices of Community Eco-
nomic Development Lauyers, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 437, 452.
129. See generally Trubek & Farnham, supra note 127.
130. Selbin & Del Monte, supra note 123, at 127.
131. Id. at 130.
132. See Memorandum to All SLO Employees, Student Lawyers, and Social Work Interns
fromJacqueline St.Joan, in TRUBEK & FARNHAM, GUIDEBOOK, supra note 104, Appendix 2.
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rules as well, except if she suspects child abuse, which is broadly
defined. 3 3 Social workers must report suspected child abuse in
Colorado, where this clinic is located. If the student lawyer subse-
quently learns information from which one might suspect child
abuse, the student is required to build a "confidentiality wall." The
student must create a private file about that information, keep it
out of the main file where a non-lawyer might find it, and not
speak about the abuse to the social worker.
13 4
Fordham's Interdisciplinary Center for Family & Child Advocacy
also addresses the ethical issues involved in its practice. 135 Social
workers in the clinic are not mandatory reporters of abuse, so the




The absence of a mandatory reporting requirement, however, does
not avoid the ethical conundrum in which a social worker could
find herself if she suspected that one of the clinic's clients was an
abuser. Social workers have their own code of ethics that encour-
ages some action be taken when such a suspicion arises. 137 Research
has found that successful collaboration in these circumstances re-
quires that both the social workers and the lawyers clarify their
roles, identify the appropriate tasks of each professional, and de-
termine in advance how they are going to handle difficult
situations.' 3 Lawyers and social workers must work together to un-
derstand and respect the different approaches that they have to
resolving clients' problems. At the Fordham Clinic, for example,
social work students act only on aspects of the clients' legal cases
and do not provide "direct" social services such as individual family
therapy, parenting skills, etc.
1'3 1
The need to recognize and institute procedures for dealing with
ethical issues as they arise was a central conclusion of Trubek and
133. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-1-103(1)(a), reprinted in TRUBEK & FARNHAM, GUIDE-
BOOK, supra note 104, Appendix 2, at 56.
134. TRUBEK & FARNHAM, GUIDEBOOK, supra note 104, Appendix 2, at 55-57.
135. INTERDISCIPLINARY CENTER FOR FAMILY & CHILD ADVOCACY, ANNUAL REPORT TO
THE DEANS 6 (Apr.-May 2002) (on file with author).
136. Beginning in 2004, however, social workers will become mandated reporters in
New York. Ann Moynihan, Memorandum: Rationale on Law/Social Work Collaborations
and the Mandatory Reporting Law in New York (on file with author) [hereinafter Moyni-
han].
137. Nat'l Ass'n of Social Workers, Code of Ethics, § 1.07(c), available at
http://www.socialworkers.org/pubs/code/code.asp ("The general expectation that social
workers will keep information confidential does not apply when disclosure is necessary to
prevent serious, foreseeable, and imminent harm to a client or other identifiable person.")
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
138. See 2 INTERDISCIPLINARY REPORT ON AT-RISK CHILDREN & FAMILIES 65 (Nov./Dec.
1999).
139. Moynihan, supra note 136.
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Farnham, who studied social justice collaboratives around the
country. They recommend determining exactly what rules govern
each profession, and then setting up a protocol for dealing with
issues as they arise. For example, on the issue of confidentiality,
there may be institutional structures, such as making some of the
collaborators employees of others, that would preserve attorney-
client privilege and confidentiality.40
Trubek & Farnham also noted some of the difficulties that pro-
fessionals encounter doing interdisciplinary work. In discussing a
collaborative in Chicago, the authors wrote:
Fostering an understanding across professions required ex-
tensive meetings and discussion. In the end, the collaborators
recognized that each profession's outlook toward the client
and the family was not going to be identical, despite sharing
an obligation to the client. Nonetheless, they could work to-
gether for a positive client outcome.
41
Non-profit MDPs provide evidence supporting Main Street
MDPs in two distinct ways. First, the collaborative nature of the ser-
vices appear to be very beneficial to lawyers and clients alike, and
second, the ethical risks have not proven grave enough to interfere
with the functioning of these practices. These social justice col-
laboratives are not perfectly analogous to Main Street MDPs,
however, because they are run as non-profits, and they tend to be
highly specialized in fields involving family relations and medical
issues. Moreover, these collaboratives may be the only choice for
the particular group of clients whom they serve because those cli-
ents do not have the option (or may not know of the option) of
seeing different professionals individually for their needs.
D. Ethical & Professional Considerations
The fact that potential demand for Main Street MDPs exists, and
non-profit MDPs appear to function effectively, does not com-
pletely determine whether for-profit Main Street MDPs would
adhere to standards of ethical practice and further the interests of
lawyers and clients alike. The testimony of lawyers, the commen-
140. TRUBEK & FARNHAM, GUIDEBOOK, supra note 104.
141. Trubek & Farnham, supra note 127, at 260.
FALL 2003]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
tary of scholars, and the examples of public interest MDPs do,
however, indicate that Main Street MDPs would promote the types
of values that should be at the core of law practice while adhering
to the ethical rules.
The MDP Commission itself, in its final recommendations to the
ABA House of Delegates in 2000, set a high bar for ethical practice.
Like the ABA House of Delegates' resolution,4 2 the MDP Commis-
sion identified the "core values" of the legal profession as
"including competence, independence of professional judgment,
protection of confidential client information, loyalty to the client
through the avoidance of conflicts of interest, and pro bono publico
obligation." 43 Little evidence suggests that Main Street MDPs
would constitute a threat to the core values identified by the MDP
Commission or the House of Delegates. On the contrary, while
preserving the values of confidentiality, independent judgment,
and loyalty through conflict-free representation, MDPs may well
promote other values that many contend should be held dearly by
lawyers. As Harris & Foran put it:
[T]he ethical prohibition on non-lawyer ownership of legal
service providers is defended as necessary to protect the 'core
values' of the profession and preserve the exercise of inde-
pendent professional judgment on behalf of clients. If the
effect of that ethical rule is, however, that a broad class of
Americans is unable to get needed legal services, one must ask
on whose behalf is that independent professional judgment
being exercised? The answer increasingly seems to be large
commercial interests that are generally well informed and well
situated to command the independence and loyalty of the
lawyers they employ in any event.
144
Although the United States has the highest per capita percent-
age of lawyers in the world, many ordinary Americans have unmet
legal needs. 4 5 One study conducted in 1994 found that "almost
two-thirds of moderate-income Americans with legal needs in 1992
received no professional assistance.' 46 The testimony before the
MDP Commission, and the ruminations of commentators both
suggest that low- and moderate-income people would be more
comfortable visiting an MDP that includes a lawyer than seeking
142. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
143. 2000 Report, supra note 34 (emphasis in original).
144. Harris & Foran, supra note 7, at 776, 835.
145. Debro, supra note 89; Harris & Foran, supra note 7, at 790.
146. Harris & Foran, supra note 7, at 792.
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out a lawyer in a traditional practice. 7 Meeting the legal needs of
Americans is an important value of the profession, and was one of
the rationales for upholding prepaid legal services plans, another
form of practice implicating non-lawyers which the organized bar
initially opposed. 4 Despite the large number of lawyers in this na-
tion, many people have unmet legal needs. That fact underlies the
recognized, if not mandatory, duty on every lawyer to do pro bono
work. 49 It is noteworthy that one of the unsubstantiated objections
concerning MDPs was that MDPs might not support their own law-
yers' professional duty to do pro bono work. Yet Main Street MDPs,
like pro bono work, enable people who are not currently being
served to obtain legal services.50
Another oft-mentioned objection to MDPs is the risk that non-
lawyers in the firm would exert pressure on the lawyers to forego
their duty of independent professional judgment when such judg-
ment might have negative financial repercussions for the firm. One
solution to that concern is for MDPs to have separate legal de-
partments, supervised entirely by lawyers, responsible for all
decisions relating to those lawyers' employment.15 ' The MDP
Commission endorsed this idea for "large-size" MDPs.152 The result
of this for Main Street MDPs, however, would be to isolate the law-
yers so that the client who seeks the services of non-lawyers and
lawyers, still ends up getting advice from two professionals sepa-
rately, even thought they are in the same MDP. -5 This would defeat
much of the purpose of the MDP, which is to address the client's
needs in a coordinated way.
A better way to consider the issue of independent judgment is to
recognize the threats to its existence in traditional firms. Private
law firms are for-profit businesses and the pressures that this cre-
147. Id.
148. See United Trans. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine
Workers of America, Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
149. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.1, comment 1 states: "Every lawyer, regard-
less of professional prominence or professional workload, has a responsibility to provide
legal services to those unable to pay, and personal involvement in the problems of the disad-
vantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer."
150. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 16, at 126-27 ("Low- and middle-income indi-
viduals and small businesses, who are excellent candidates for receiving multidisciplinary
services, are likely not to obtain professional legal and non-legal services in the ordering of
their personal and business matters.... The public deserves the opportunity to receive ser-
vices from such providers, and society is likely to be worse off if these clients do not receive
multidisciplinary services.").
151. 2000 Report, supra note 34.
152. Id.
153. Brustin, supra note 55, at 962.
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ates are substantial. Financial pressures can lead to various types of
conduct that interfere with lawyers' independent judgment, in-
cluding billing fraud, 54 drug and alcohol abuse,5  and mistakes
resulting from overwork and stress. 5 6 Several current forms of
permitted practice, such as in-house counsel and lawyers employed
by insurance companies, place the lawyer in a situation where the
financial interests of third-parties have the potential to affect the
lawyer's independent judgment.'57 Contingency fees and the acqui-
sition of an interest in a client's business are common payment
schemes for lawyers that carry a risk of interfering with independ-
ent judgment. 15 The relevant questions for the Main Street MDP
debate are whether the pressure on lawyers practicing in small
groups with non-lawyers would be more significant than it already
is, 5 and if so, whether the benefits are substantial enough to out-
weigh the risks.
Another potential threat to the independent judgment of law-
yers that might arise in Main Street MDPs is the pressure of one
member to refer, and then not contradict, other members. If a cli-
ent went to an MDP to speak with a lawyer about a divorce, what
would be the process by which that lawyer decides whether to sug-
gest that the client invite the social worker to participate in their
discussion? The MDP might have an incentive to include another
professional in order to raise the fee. Similarly, if a lawyer and a
financial planner were advising the client on her portfolio, and the
lawyer disagreed with the investment advice, would the lawyer feel
pressure not to voice that disagreement? The incentive to keep the
peace and continue the representation might override the lawyer's
independent judgment. One solution to this, suggested below, is to
154. Lisa Lehrman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659 (1990).
155. Rick B. Allan, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse, and Lawyers: Are We Ready to Address the Denial,
31 CREIGHTON L. Rv. 265 (1997).
156. John A. Edington, Managing Lawyers' Risks at the Millennium, 73 TUL. L. REv. 1987,
1994 n.24 (1990).
157. Professor Terry calls the pressure on lawyers employed by third-party payor insur-
ance companies "tremendous." Terry, supra note 5, at 928.
158. Written Remarks of Stefan F. Tucker, Chair, ABA Section of Taxation, to ABA
Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 4, 1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/tuckerl.html (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). One of
the most important ways lawyers are currently protected from what might otherwise be sub-
stantial interference with their professional judgment is by the current rule against passive
investment in law firms. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2002). Professor
Dzienkowski testified before the MPD Commission that the prohibition of passive invest-
ment should continue with MDPs as a way of protecting independent judgment. Non-
lawyers are more likely to interfere with judgment to benefit the economic interests of the
firm if they have investors to whom they answer. Dzienkowski, supra note 58. The prohibition
is substantiallyjustified, and any rule allowing for Main Street MDPs should continue it.
159. SeeJones, supra note 79, at 996.
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prohibit anyone in the MDP from selling products to clients, such
as securities, life insurance, or the services of a broker, for which
anyone in the MDP receives a commission. '
The issue is not how to prevent these pressures entirely, but how
to ensure that lawyers are capable of carrying out their ethical re-
sponsibilities when these pressures do arise. If we assume lawyers
are able to retain their independent judgment and focus on the
best interests of their clients under current rules, which allow for
the various pressures described above, there is little reason to think
that lawyers will suddenly buckle under the pressure exerted by a
non-lawyer colleague.
The best evidence from non-profit practice groups demonstrates
significant benefits from Main Street MDPs. Yet, because these
practices are non-profit and generally do not subject their lawyers
to financial pressures found in private firms, one cannot draw clear
conclusions about the effect that working in a Main Street MDP
would have on the independent judgment of its lawyers. Given the
likely benefits of these practices, however, and the fact that lawyers
already have experience dealing with threats to their independ-
ence, the non-profit practice experience further supports the case
for experimentation.
Interestingly, reported ethical problems concerning confidenti-
ality in the non-profit, MDP context focuses almost exclusively on
the reporting obligations of social workers.6 1 These problems are
dealt with by seeking informed consent from clients, and instruct-
ing the professionals about how to handle the situation as it arises.
Lawyers practicing in small private MDPs would presumably see
fewer clients where child abuse would be an issue than do clinics
that concentrate on a particular population.
Moreover, perhaps unlike many of the clients of non-profit
MDPs, clients of Main Street MDPs could freely decide whether the
risk that the structure of the MDP might result in the loss of the
attorney-client privilege or confidentiality is worth the potential
benefit from seeking services through an MDP. These potential
clients, as paying clients, would be unlike many non-profit MDP
clients and could choose to go to traditional law firms instead.
Thus, the bedrock rule of Main Street MDPs should be absolute
transparency about confidentiality issues, coupled with a full ex-
planation of any consent or waiver forms that clients are asked to
sign.
160. See infra notes 169-172 and accompanying text.
161. Trubek & Farnham, supra note 127, at 241, 249.
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Conflicts of interest concerned many of those who studied this
issue and testified before the MDP Commission because of the
sheer size of the large accounting firms and what many assumed
would be the size of law firms once they took on non-lawyer part-
ners. A small MDP could deal with conflicts of interest in the same
way they already handle them.
As with confidentiality, small-scale, private MDPs are unlikely to
encounter frequently the types of serious conflicts issues that op-
ponents fear. No one has suggested that practicing in an MDP
would change the ethical obligations, including the duty to avoid
conflicts of interest, to which lawyers must adhere. The MDP
Commission recommended that, for conflicts purposes, every cli-
ent of a lawyer in an MDP is a client of all of the lawyers in the
MDP, as the rule currently stands for law firms.1 62 It would make
sense to extend that rule to non-lawyers in a Main Street MDP. This
would mean, for example, that the same firm probably could not
represent a husband in a divorce proceeding when the wife has
sought counseling services from the firm.
Conflict of interest issues are more likely to arise in large MDPs,
just as they arise more frequently in large law firms. Even in the
public interest field, a large firm will experience more conflicts of
interest than a small firm. Trubek and Farnham describe a partner
at a large Wisconsin law firm who does a lot of work with other pro-
fessionals on community economic development for non-profit
clients. The biggest ethical problems for this partner are conflicts
between his clients and the clients of other partners of his firm.
63
The key for this lawyer is transparency and explaining to his clients
the conflicts rules and the fact that he may be required to with-
draw.
The examples of public interest MDPs suggest that lawyers prac-
ticing in private, Main Street MDPs could face specific and
identifiable ethical dilemmas, including confidentiality issues and
conflicts of interest. These examples also suggest a less well de-
fined, although likely more common problem of the clashing of
professional cultures. For MDPs to work well, lawyers must under-
stand their role not as central, but as "one of many important
voices."1 64 Trubek and Farnham note that to function in a social
justice collaborative, lawyers have to unlearn some of what they
learn in law school. Different professional mores, particularly those
in the "helping" professions like social work, require "going be-
162. 1999R port, supra note 1, at 6.
163. Trubek & Farnham, supra note 127, at 256.
164. Selbin & Del Monte, supra note 123, at 128.
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yond helping clients to assert legal rights to thinking about how to
improve clients' lives by using law in combination with other types
of expertise.""'5 Witnesses testified before the MDP Commission
about the desire of small firm and solo practitioners to partner
with non-lawyers in order to serve their clients more effectively."'
This was particularly true of lawyers in the family law and estate-
planning areas."7 Practitioners in social justice collaboratives and
other types of non-profit MDPs also echoed this desire .168 This indi-
cates that lawyers might be willing to adjust their professional
attitudes to pursue what they perceive as a more productive and
satisfying practice.
PART III
Having highlighted the potential benefits and risks of Main
Street MDPs, the challenge is to carve out a rule, an exception to
Model Rule 5.4, which would allow Main Street MDPs only. This
requires defining a Main Street MDP and then incorporating
whatever precautions are deemed necessary to address the most
serious and probable risks with that form of practice into the rule.
Although simply limiting the number of lawyers and non-lawyer
professionals in an MDP avoids many of the potential threats to
core values, a rule permitting Main Street MDPs still must address
other issues. A model rule should include an explanation of the
need for full disclosure about the nature of the MDP and the risks
it involves as well as a requirement that the MDP register with the
state court or bar. Although the MDP Commission recommended
this only for MDPs not controlled by lawyers, this Article argues
that all MDPs should register with the state's highest court. Regis-
tration would facilitate data collection about MDPs and allow for
informed assessment of their effectiveness. It would also highlight
the risks involved for the members of the MDP and perhaps re-
mind them of their ethical responsibilities.
Other structural rules would help protect the duty of independ-
ent judgment. First, the prohibition against passive investment
165. TRUBEK & FARNHAM, GUIDEBOOK supra note 104, at 8.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. Trubek & Farnham, supra note 127, at 241.
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should apply to MDPs.' 69 Just as with law firms, the prospect of law-
yers or non-lawyers answering to outside investors poses a
substantial risk to the fiduciary relationship of lawyer and client.'
70
Second, the rule should state that neither lawyers nor non-lawyers
in the MDP could sell products to clients for which anyone in the
MDP would receive a commission. Lawyers are currently discour-
aged from entering into business transactions with clients because
of the risks self-interested business transactions pose to a lawyer's
fiduciary duties to clients. 7' The risks would be essentially the same
if it were not the lawyer, but the lawyer's partner or associate offer-
ing such products. The commissions from the products, such as
commissions received by insurance agents and securities dealers,
could distort both the legal and non-legal advice that the client
receives, since the seller of the product and anyone who would also
profit by its sale have personal financial incentives that may not
coincide with the client's best interests. Allowing lawyers to directly
associate their legal advice with the sale of products from which
they would profit creates too great of a risk.
This same rationale underlies the rule that lawyers may open
"law-related" businesses and offer services to their clients if they
keep those businesses separate. Lawyers who have "ancillary busi-
nesses" selling insurance, securities, or real estate, for example,
must make clear to their clients that the protections of the lawyer-
client relationship do not apply when they are serving in a non-
lawyer capacity. 17 It is worth noting that "law-related" services are
considered ethical if lawyers abide by the transparency rules. Ancil-
lary businesses by lawyers have been steadily growing in popularity
due in large part to lawyer recognition of client demand for more
comprehensive services."13 Prohibiting MDPs from selling products
to their clients would make members of MDPs less likely to be in-
fluenced by personal financial gain than lawyers practicing in
traditional firms who also had a stake in an ancillary business. Law-
yers involved in ancillary businesses, even if they follow the
169. Professor Dzienkowski proposed prohibiting passive investment in MDPs as a way
of protecting independentjudgment. Dzienkowski, supra note 58. He argued that this makes
it harder for non-lawyers to interfere with judgment to benefit the economic interests of the
firm. Id.
170. See supra note 158.
171. See MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.8(a) cmt. 1 (2002): "A lawyer's legal skill
and training, together with the relationship of trust and confidence between lawyer and
client, create the possibility of overreaching when the lawyer participates in a business,
property or financial transaction with the client." See also Daly, supra note 2, at 242.
172. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 5.7(a) (2) (2002).
173. Robert W. Denney, Branching Out: Lawyers are Diversifying and Getting into Ancillary
Businesses: Is It Good or Bad for the Profession , PENN. LAw., Dec. 2000, at 34.
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transparency requirements of Model Rule 5.7, are still at risk of
allowing their personal financial interests to influence their advice
when their law clients become clients of the ancillary business as
well.'
74
Limiting MDPs' ability to collect commissions by selling law-
related products such as securities, insurance or real estate, would
limit the types of MDPs that could be formed. A securities firm,
insurance agent or real estate broker probably would not be inter-
ested in joining a firm that prohibited commissions. But this only
reinforces the point of the proposed rule, to commence the MDP
experiment on a small scale with firms that pose the fewest risks to
ethical practice.
The MDP Commission addressed many of these issues in its rec-
ommendations. The Commission, in both its 1999 and 2000
reports, set out the principles under which a rule allowing MDPs
should be written, without drafting a model rule or rewriting Rule
5.4175 The 2000 recommendations stated:
RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association amend the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct consistent with the fol-
lowing principles:
1. Lawyers should be permitted to share fees and join
with non-lawyer professionals in a practice that de-
livers both legal and non-legal professional services
(Multidisciplinary Practice), provided that the law-
yers have the control and authority necessary to
assure lawyer independence in the rendering of legal
services. "Non-lawyer professionals" means members
of recognized professions or other disciplines that
are governed by ethical standards.
2. This Recommendation must be implemented in a
manner that protects the public and preserves the
core values of the legal profession, including com-
petence, independence of professional judgment,
protection of confidential client information, loy-
alty to the client through the avoidance of conflicts
of interest, and pro bono publico obligations.
174. See Wolfram, supra note 12, at 964-66 (describing how current ancillary business
options are not adequate).
175. See 2000 Report, supra note 34; 1999 Report, supra note 1.
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3. Regulatory authorities should enforce existing rules
and adopt such additional enforcement procedures
as are needed to implement these principles and to
protect the public interest.
4. The prohibition on non-lawyers delivering legal ser-
vices and the obligations of all lawyers to observe
the rules of professional conduct should not be al-
tered.
5. Passive investment in a Multidisciplinary Practice
should not be permitted."
6
To limit this recommendation to the establishment of Main
Street MDPs, the following principles might be added:
6. Firms engaging in multidisciplinary practice may
have no more than 30 professional (i.e. non-
support staff) members at any time. 7
7. Before any client engages a lawyer who practices in
the MDP, the lawyer must obtain the client's in-
formed consent, in writing.7" As part of obtaining
informed consent, the lawyer must explain to the
client the nature of the MDP and any risks to the
ordinary attorney-client relationship present in the
MDP that would not be present if the client en-
gaged a lawyer practicing alone or only with other
lawyers.
8. As a condition of permitting a lawyer to engage in
the practice of law in an MDP, the MDP is required
to register with the highest court with the authority
to regulate the legal profession in each jurisdiction
in which the MDP is engaged in the delivery of legal
services.
7 "
9. None of the lawyers or non-lawyer professionals
who practice in the MDP shall sell products to cli-
ents for which any lawyer or non-lawyer professional
in the MDP receives a commission.
176. See 2000 Report, supra note 34.
177. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
178. The recent revisions to the Model Rules introduce the concept of "informed con-
sent," which is defined as "agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the
lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of
and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct." MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT 1.0(e) (2002). This concept should be incorporated into the transparency
requirements of the MDP.
179. See 1999 REPORT, supra note 1, at Recommendation 14.
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CONCLUSION
Despite all of the debate about MDPs, few have considered the
possibility of creating different MDP rules for different types of
MDPs. Professor Terry acknowledged that the larger the MDP, the
less influence the lawyer will have and the more tempting it will be
to violate ethics rules, and that this distinction is the "closest [she]
can find to a principled basis for distinguishing the MDP prac-
tice."' 80 Nevertheless, Terry rejected different rules for different
MDPs because of the difficulty in drawing the lines that would de-
fine Main Street MDPs and exclude larger firms. 8' She also
pointed to witnesses before the MDP Commission who "urged the
Commission not to fragment the bar," which she contended might
happen if only small MDPs were allowed.82
The solution to the line-drawing problem is simply to draw lines.
Lines are drawn all the time in the law despite knowledge that the
result will be some over-inclusiveness and some under-
inclusiveness. 83 There is no magic in the number '30' and it is, by
necessity, somewhat random. This number seems small enough to
avoid major conflict problems, while large enough so as not to
limit Main Street MDPs only to the smallest firms. Size limitations
appear effective in minimizing the ethical risks that MDPs pose,
particularly the risk of conflicts of interest, independent judgment,
and loss of confidentiality. Progress and success tends to be associ-
ated with bigger and better, so it might be considered naive to
suggest that MDPs should not be permitted to grow beyond a cer-
tain point, but it might be exactly such a prohibition that will
guarantee their success both ethically and financially.
The more practical problem is whether state bar associations,
which typically suggest rules to their state supreme court for adop-
tion, would be able to agree on where the line should be. Large
firms, which would not be permitted to practice as MDPs, might
not relish the competition from new MDPs that might be able to
offer more services at a lower cost. The legal landscape in a par-
ticular state will substantially affect whether the proposed rule is
passed. It might be easier for such a rule to pass in smaller, less ur-
ban states, where most lawyers practice in small settings, than in
180. Terry, supra note 5, at 929.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 930.
183. See generally Joseph Tussman & Jacobus ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
37 CAL. L. REv. 341 (1949).
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New York, where Wall Street firms dominate. On the other hand, it
may be that the sheer number of lawyers and forms of practice in a
state like California would make such an experiment non-
threatening to traditional firms. The larger firms might not feel
threatened by, or have any other reason to object to, Main Street
MDPs with whom they do not consider themselves in competition.
The fragmentation objection is not as easy to pin down. Very few
of those testifying before the MDP Commission considered the
possibility of different rules for different size firms. Some offered
testimony that any rule allowing MDPs should focus on the ethics
of individual lawyers, not the type of MDP.184 Others who testified
assumed that a rule permitting MDPs would apply to all MDPs, 5s
although some testimony suggested that even with one set of rules,
disclosure levels might vary, depending on the sophistication of the
client.186
Limitations on the size of MDPs would not address all of the is-
sues. Complete transparency would still be necessary, particularly
about the fact that the client was free to remain with one of the
professionals even if she wanted to go elsewhere for the other ser-
vices. A client who goes to an MDP consisting of a lawyer, social
worker, and financial planner for the purposes of writing a will,
would need to be told that she could use all or just some of the
services offered and was free to go elsewhere for any of those ser-
vices. That is, one-stop-shopping is entirely by the choice of the
client. The fear that the lawyer will inappropriately steer the client
toward incompetent non-lawyers in the firm is no more threaten-
ing than the current situation, where lawyers routinely assign
matters for which they have been hired to other partners or associ-
ates in a firm, or refer matters out to other firms. Competence
would be the concern of the whole MDP, just as it is currently the
concern of the whole law firm.
It is difficult to see the harm that could be done by allowing the
formation of small firms that offer integrated multidisciplinary ser-
184. Statement of Kathryn A. Oberly, Vice Chair and General Counsel, Ernst & Young,
L.L.P., to ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice, at 3 (Feb. 4, 1999), available at
http://-ww.abanet.org/cpr/oberlyl.html (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of
Law Reform); Oral Testimony of Irwin L. Treiger & William J. Lipton, co-chairs of the Na-
tional Conference of Lawyers and Certified Public Accountants, to ABA Comm'n on
Multidisciplinary Practice, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/aicpa.html [hereinafter
Treiger & Lipton] (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
185. Written Testimony of Lawrence J. Fox to ABA Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Prac-
tice, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/foxl.html (on file with the University of
MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
186. Treiger & Lipton, supra note 184.
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vices to clients. Small MDPs would test client demand,1 8 7 lawyer
demand, and the possibility of preserving core values in this set-
ting. Were the experiment successful, it would provide empirical
evidence from which rules could be formulated for larger MDPs
and their success could be predicted. Or, the experience might
indicate that the ethical risks of MDPs outweigh their benefits. As
the law and ethics rules stand now, wealthy clients and corpora-
tions can receive services that are quite close to what they would
get if MDPs were allowed. Attorneys are currently employed by
large accounting firms that advise corporations as well as by smaller
financial firms that advise wealthy individuals.18 Although they
claim not to be giving legal advice, these firms have been tremen-
dously successful in responding to client demand for integrated
services by skirting the ethical prohibitions on fee sharing and
partnering with non-lawyers. The current prohibition on MDPs
only hurts lower- to middle-income individuals who do not have
access to larger, expensive firms, but have an equal or greater need
for comprehensive services. 89
The benefits of one-stop-shopping, coordinated advice, and
economic efficiency apply to Wall Street and Main Street firms
alike. The ethical risks involved in the former, however, are much
more substantial and serious than in the latter.
As with any experiment, this one could fail. Main Street MDPs
might be more trouble than they are worth. The possible reasons
for such an outcome are numerous: it might be difficult to attract
other professionals to work with lawyers; the combination of pro-
fessionals working together may not work because of a clash of
custom and practice or because of the difficulty of arriving at an
acceptable financial arrangement. There might be many lawyers
who, for financial, ethical, or personal reasons, would have no in-
terest in partnering with other professionals, just as there will be
clients who just want to see a lawyer. Yet the data from non-profit
legal services providers indicates that, in many situations, clients
and lawyers alike believe that service is improved through multidis-
187. See Weber, supra note 4 (claiming that, once consumers became aware of MDPs,
they would flock to them).
188. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
189. See Written Remarks of James C. Turner, Executive Director, HALT, Inc., to ABA
Comm'n on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 5, 1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/turnerl.html ("Today, cost and complexity remain the largest barriers that prevent
access to the civil justice system. Tens of millions of low- and moderate-income Americans
cannot afford to hire a lawyer when they have a legal problem, and millions of others are
intimidated by even the prospect of trying to deal with the system on their own.") (on file
with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
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ciplinary practice. The official public debate about MDPs has been
going on for more than five years with empirical and normative
claims being made on all sides. It is time to test those claims on a
small scale.
